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Abstract
Maurice Merleau-Ponty was an important twentieth century contributor to the
theory of recognition, even though he made literal reference to the concept only
sparingly. He emphasized the importance of recognition, not only at the level of
inter-personal relations and in the individual’s inclusion in the social, but also in
terms of the capacity of human beings to communicate across cultures and across
historical distances. The shift towards ontology in his later work provided a
renewed grounding for his interest in intersubjectivity and cross-cultural commu-
nication. Such continuity might be traced to lasting Hegelian and Marxian
legacies in his thinking, which inflected his political interpretation of recognition.
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1 Introduction
There are a number of layers in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical work that directly
relate to aspects of a theory of recognition. These layers can be traced throughout the
different periods in his writing, beyond the varying degrees of emphasis and the
changing methodological tools and core theoretical references he used. They all
contribute to his rich vision of human existence as being inherently social and
historical.
2 Layers of Recognition
We can find the trace of these layers already in Merleau-Ponty’s first major text, The
Structure of Behaviour, in the last part of the book dedicated to “the human order”
(Merleau-Ponty 1963, 160–184). There, we see an articulation of two of the most
important themes that traverse his work and that have substantial connections to
recognition.
The first is the irrepressible evidence of the existence of other beings like me, in
other words my immediate recognition of the other human being as an alter ego
whose behavior and modes of expression demand specific kinds of responses,
symbolic and normative, from me. Already in his first thesis, and as he continued
to do throughout his teaching and writing, Merleau-Ponty addressed the problem of
“other minds” by recourse to developmental psychology. This methodological angle
directly anticipated the later developments of recognition theory, in which ontoge-
netic arguments feature prominently. This ontogenetic angle to study the structure
and significance of intersubjective relationships explains Merleau-Ponty’s constant
engagement with Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalysis, another trait anticipa-
ting later recognition theory.
A second significant layer related to recognition is the constitutive importance of
the social and cultural worlds for individual existence. In his first book, Merleau-Ponty
already tried to find a solution to a problem that occupied him throughout his
intellectual life: how to account dialectically for supra-subjective “structures” in such
a way that their framing power over individual consciousness and individual action is
accounted for, yet their dependence upon the expressive and creative capacities of
subjects and groups is equally highlighted. This problem is linked to recognition in
two ways: first, it anticipates contemporary attempts to approach social ontology from
the perspective of recognition. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, what is at stake here is the
capacity of human subjects to collectively “institute” symbolic and normative realities
that organize life in common. Having been created by individuals working with others,
institutions are always amenable to being transformed with others (Merleau-Ponty
2010). The social-ontological perspective is informed by a reflection on the conditions
of transformative political action. The second recognition perspective entailed in
Merleau-Ponty’s dialectical understanding of the relationship between subjective life
and objective structures links the symbolic sense of intentionality to the epistemic
sense of recognition. Since social and cultural institutions are “instituted” through
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intentional acts and meaningful practices, they remain in principle accessible for
human understanding across space and time. Throughout his work, Merleay-Ponty
explored the idea that there is an a priori possibility of recognition of human subjects,
societies and cultures, by other subjects, across cultural boundaries and across histo-
rical times (see notably Merleau-Ponty 1973, 9–29).
3 Recognition after the Ontological Turn
In his latest period, these ideas were reformulated after he significantly altered his
method to shed the subjectivistic focus of his previous work. He now explained the
possibility of sharing the world in common through a feature of being itself, namely
the fact that whatever is objectively in the world, is “sensible”, i.e., contains the
intrinsic quality of being able to be sensed. The subjective perspective is thus
inherent in objectivity itself, sensing and being sensed are on the same plane, two
dimensions of the one reality. He termed this the reversibility of being and captured
this key feature through the metaphor of the “flesh”. From this perspective, human
perception, action and expression are not just species-dependent modes of being in
the world, but reveal structures of reality itself. This conception signals a radical shift
in the grounding of recognition, away from psychological or anthropological argu-
ments. Intersubjective, cross-cultural and cross-historical recognition are made pos-
sible simply because human individuals and groups all share in the same element of
being. Since we are all made of the same “flesh”, the “flesh of the world”, beyond
personal and cultural differences in accessing the world, we share the same ontolo-
gical ground. There is in principle no obstacle to inter-personal and inter-cultural
communication: “there is here no problem of the alter ego because it is not I who
sees, not he who sees, because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a vision
in general, in virtue of that primordial property that belongs to the flesh, being here
and now, of radiating everywhere and forever, being an individual, of being also a
dimension and a universal” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 142).
4 Hegelian and Marxian Legacies in Merleau-Ponty’s Theory
of Recognition
There are other layers of recognition in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking, which come to light
especially if we focus on some of his earlier writings. In The Structure of Behaviour, he
described the collective institutions of meaning and norms by reference to the concept
of “human work” (Merleau-Ponty 193, 162). This refers to the capacity of individual
subjects to “recognize” in the achievements of other individuals and indeed of the
collective, the product of human work understood in a generic sense, in the sense
notably of Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts. This articulation of intersubjectivity and socia-
lity in terms of “praxis”, as the French philosophers were wont to say at the time,
points to lasting Hegelian and Marxian legacies in Merleau-Ponty’s work. Such
legacies are documented firstly in the literal reference to recognition in its Hegelian
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version. Merleau-Ponty was well acquainted with Hegel’s work as a whole, including
the Jena manuscripts. In his references to Hegel, however, he tended to emphasise the
Phenomenology of Spirit and in particular the chapter on the struggle of self-
consciousnesses for the recognition of their freedom (see his review of a famous
conference by Jean Hyppolite in Merleau-Ponty 1964, 63–70). In contrast with other
philosophers who used this passage as the ultimate cypher for conceptualising social
bonds and social action, Merleau-Ponty sought to integrate it within his broader vision
of intersubjective and social recognition. As the chapter on “The Other and the Human
World” in The Phenomenology of Perception demonstrates, the idea that the struggle
for recognition is a necessary moment in the reciprocal affirmation of each other’s
freedom can definitely be acknowledged as a structural possibility (Merleau-Ponty
2012, 374). And yet such conflict is premised upon a more fundamental layer, namely
the embodied co-presence of individuals within their shared social world. Recognitive
practices arise from the fact that the social is the “permanent field and dimension” of
individual existence (379).
AMarxist inflection to recognition can be seen in the texts in whichMerleau-Ponty
sought to delineate the political contours of his vision of trans-historical, trans-cultural
communication. The motto summarizing Merleau-Ponty’s core ideal, which he iden-
tified with the promise of Marxism, was the “recognition of the human being by the
human being” (Merleau-Ponty 1969, 111–112). This motto encapsulated the approach
to political problems he took consistently throughout the turbulent post-war period. It
formed the basis of his advocacy for a “humanism of all human beings” (Merleau-
Ponty 1964, 260).
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